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Introduction 
In a series of high-profile books with titles such as The Language Instinct (Pinker  1994), How the 
Mind Works (Pinker 1997) and The Blank Slate (Pinker  2002) Steven Pinker has  developed a view  of 
the mind that has substantial nativist commitments. According to Pinker, as a result of evolution the 
mind consists of a rich battery of domain specific computational modules each of which is hard wired 
with particular concepts and knowledge to enable it to perform its central task. However, in his latest 
work The Stuff of Thought (Pinker 2007) Pinker makes it clear that there are limits to his nativism. In 
particular, he argues against Jerry Fodor’s extreme concept nativism, the view that most, if not all, of 
our lexical concepts1 are innate. According to Pinker, as Fodor estimates that a typical speaker’s 
vocabulary contains some 50,000 distinct items this commits Fodor to there being some 50,000 innate 
concepts. Actually, Fodor’s position would appear to be more extreme than this as he states that the 
Oxford English Dictionary has approximately 500,000 entries implying that there is the same number 
of innate concepts. With respect to   the typical speaker of English, either most of her innate concepts 
will be un-triggered or she will not have learned the English words that express most the concepts she 
has. For Pinker, Fodor’s extreme concept nativism, even on its more modest reading, is a nativist step 
to far; we certainly do have a stock of   innate concepts but nowhere near 50,000.  
Elsewhere (Cain 2004) I have expressed considerable sympathy for Fodor’s extreme concept 
nativism and in this article I will seek to defend its conclusion from Pinker’s attack. I will argue that 
Pinker’s assault on its core premise that lexical concepts typically cannot be analysed fails. Moreover, 
even if Pinker is correct on this point, he runs the risk of awakening poverty of the stimulus 
considerations that would serve to motivate Fodor’s conclusion that   we do not learn most of our 
concepts. 
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§ 1. Fodor’s argument for Extreme Concept Nativism 
 
For Fodor, with respect to concept acquisition the central distinction is that between a concept’s being 
innate and its being learned. An innate concept need not be present at birth, at least in a form available 
for deployment in thought. For, some concepts need to be triggered by specific experiences. Triggering 
differs from learning in that it is a brute-causal rather than a  rational-causal process (Fodor 1981). 
Learning, at least with respect to learning a concept or the meaning of a word, is a process of 
hypothesis formation and confirmation. Thus  learning the concept C involves forming and confirming 
a correct hypothesis about the content of C. Correlatively, learning the meaning of word W involves  
forming and confirming a correct hypothesis about  the meaning  of W.   
We are now in a position to understand Fodor’s argument for extreme concept nativism. In order 
to form a hypothesis one needs the relevant concepts. Consider the case of learning the meaning of a  
word, “dog” for example. The relevant hypothesis would represent “dog” as meaning dog. But in order 
to frame this hypothesis one would need a concept with a content corresponding to that of the meaning 
of the word ‘dog’. In other words, one would need the concept DOG. Generalised, the point is that in 
order to learn the meaning of a word one must have a prior grasp of the very concept that corresponds 
to the meaning of the target word. So whatever one learns when one learns the meaning of a word it is 
not a new concept.  Fodor presented this argument in The Language of Thought (Fodor 1975). In the 
later article “The Present State of the Innateness Controversy” (Fodor 1981) he produces what is 
essentially the same argument in a discussion of concept learning. Learning a concept involves forming 
and confirming a hypothesis as to the content of the target concept but in order to do this one must have 
prior grasp of a concept that has the same content as the target concept. For example, in order to learn 
the concept DOG one must already have a concept with the content dog. But a concept with the content 
dog just is the concept DOG so one cannot learn that concept. Generalised, the result is that it is 
impossible to learn a concept as to learn a given concept one must already have that very concept. 
Therefore, our concepts must be innate.  
There is an obvious line of response to the above argument that can be expressed as follows. We 
have an innate stock of basic concepts that we can use to define non-basic concepts outside of that 
stock. Learning a concept involves constructing a definition in terms of basic concepts and in so doing 
acquiring a new concept. For example, learning the concept BACHELOR involves constructing a 
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definition utilising the more basic concepts MAN and UNMARRIED. As the concept BACHELOR 
cannot be identified with either of these more basic concepts, there is an important respect in which one 
does learn a new concept when one confirms the hypothesis that bachelors are unmarried men. 
Therefore, the concept BACHELOR is not innate. 
Fodor flirted with this attempt to escape the clutches of extreme concept nativism in The Language 
of Thought. However, by the time of “The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy” he had come 
to see it as a hopeless move for the simple reason that very few lexical concepts of English can be 
defined. BACHELOR is therefore atypical. This line of thought is also prominent in Concepts (Fodor 
1998: chs 3 and 4). He argues that despite the exertion of considerable energy by philosophers and 
linguists, there are few lexical concepts that have been given plausible definitions. Typically, whenever 
a philosopher or linguist produces a definition of a target concept, one of her colleagues presents a 
compelling counter-example.2 From the repeated failure of attempts to produce such definitions, Fodor 
induces the conclusion that most lexical concepts are indefinable. In other words, rather than being 
analysable in terms of more basic concepts, most lexical concepts are conceptual atoms. The upshot of 
this is that most lexical concepts – for example, HOUSE, ELEPHANT, PROTON, CARBURETOR 
etc. – are innate. 
 
§ 2. Pinker on the representation of meaning 
 
One of Pinker’s central goals in The Stuff of Thought is to vindicate a theory that he labels conceptual 
semantics. This is the theory “that word meanings are represented in the mind as assemblies of basic 
concepts in the language of thought” (Pinker: 91). In this section I will give an account of conceptual 
semantics and Pinker’s argument for it. 
Pinker begins by considering what at first sight appears to be “a mundane problem in 
psycholinguistics” (2007: 25). The problem in question relates to constructions built around a locative 
verb. Consider the sentence “Bill loaded paper into the recycling bin”. This is a content-locative as its 
focuses on the contents (in this case the paper) that are loaded into the container (the recycling bin). 
The situation described by this sentence can also be described by the sentence “Bill loaded the 
recycling bin with paper”. This sentence is a container-locative as it focuses attention on the container 
rather than the contents. Many other verbs allow this alternation between the content-locative and the 
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container-locative construction, for example, “spray”, “splash” and “rub”. This might suggest that there 
is a rule of English of the following form and that a child learning English must learn this rule:  
 
“If a verb can appear in a content-locative construction, then it can also appear in a container-
locative construction, and vice versa.” (Pinker 2007: 35-36) 
 
However, this cannot be a rule of English as it is violated in both directions. There are verbs that can 
appear in a content-locative construction but not in a container locative construction. Examples include 
“pour”,   “nail” and “coil”.  One can say “Maya poured milk into her glass” but not “Maya poured her 
glass with milk”. And there are verbs that can appear in the container-locative but not the content-
locative such as to fill, drench and cover. One can say “Theo drenched his shirt with water” but not 
“Theo drenched water onto his shirt”.  
Pinker raises the question as to why some locative verbs permit locative alternation whilst others 
do not. His answer is inspired by the work of the linguists Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995, 2005) 
and can be described in the following terms. There are different microclasses of locative verbs and the 
members of a given microclass have an element of their meaning in common despite the fact that they 
refer to events that appear very different from one another. This element of commonality relates to the 
physics, the geometry and the human purpose of the events that the verbs refer to.  Consider the 
microclass that includes the following verbs: “dribble, drip, drop, dump, funnel, ladle, pour, shake, 
siphon, slop, slosh, spill, spoon" (53). These refer to events where the agent “allows gravity   to do the 
work” (53). Such verbs contrast with “brush, daub, plaster, rub, slather, smear, smudge, spread, streak, 
swab” (53) which refer to events where the agent   “applies force to a substance and surface 
simultaneously by pushing one against the other” (53). Pinker sums up the difference between the 
physics and geometry of these two microclasses of verbs thus: “It’s the difference between causing and 
letting, between acting on something directly and acting on it via an intermediary force, between 
expecting something to change as one is doing something in real time and expecting it to change 
shortly after one has done something” (53). 
Verbs in the “brush” microclass permit locative alternation whilst those in the “pour” microclass 
do not; they can only appear in content-locative constructions. That this is the case is down to the 
physics and geometry that is reflected in their meaning. As “brush” verbs refer to events where force  is 
  50,000 Innate Concepts 
 5 
simultaneously applied to both a stuff and a surface the event can be described either by focussing on 
the stuff (as in  a  content-locative  construction) or on the surface (as in a container-locative 
construction). However, with the “pour” verbs matters are different. With these verbs ‘gravity stands 
between what the agent  does and  how the surface gets  wet,  so the agent is less easily construed as 
acting directly  on the container and these verbs appear only in the content-locative construction’ (55-
56). With a verb like drench, it belongs to a microclass containing verbs which refer to how a surface 
changed whilst being neutral on the question of how the surface changing stuff got on the surface. 
Consequently, such verbs can appear in constructions that focus on the surface (the container-locative) 
but not on the manner in which the stuff arrived on the surface (the content-locative).  Pinker goes on 
to identify thirteen distinct microclasses of locative verbs and does not give the impression that he 
regards this list as exhaustive.  
Pinker regards his treatment of locative alternation has having substantial implications with respect 
to the understanding of the mind and the core concepts that it employs. For Pinker there is a distinction 
between language and thought, between words and concepts. Thinking takes place in the medium of 
the Language of Thought rather than such languages as English. Natural languages like English are 
public systems that serve to allow individuals to communicate their thoughts. Knowing a language 
involves, amongst other things, knowing what its constituent words mean, what concepts they serve to 
express. And knowing the meaning of a particular word involves representing that meaning in one’s 
mind-brain by means of concepts belonging to the Language of Thought. All of this, of course, echoes 
Fodor’s views on the relationship between language and thought.3 However, unlike Fodor, Pinker 
thinks that the representations of the meanings of many words of English must be complex, consisting 
of many distinct symbols of the Language of Thought. With respect to locative verbs those will be 
grouped into the microclasses that we have encountered. The members of a given microclass will all to 
refer events that have salient physical, geometrical and purposive features in common. This physical, 
geometrical and purposive commonality will be represented in the mind-brain of the speaker by means 
of the relevant physical, geometrical and purposive concepts. Thus, in my mind-brain the 
representation of the meaning of “pour” will overlap with that of the representation of “funnel”, as will 
“brush” with that of “smear”. But as each of these verbs has a distinctive meaning, the representation of 
that meaning will contain distinctive elements that are not common to all other members of the 
microclass. Learning the meaning of a locative verb will therefore involve constructing a complex 
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representation that draws upon physical, geometrical and purposive concepts that are employed in the 
representation of the meaning of many other locative verbs. A speaker’s views as to the grammatically 
of a particular locative construction will be sensitive to her representation of the physical and 
geometrical features of the type of event it refers to. In other words, it will be sensitive to the particular 
microclass that she assigns it to.  Thus, if in learning a new verb I assign it to the “pour” microclass that 
will thereby tell me that container-locative constructions featuring that verb will be ungrammatical. I 
will not need to be explicitly informed that such constructions are ungrammatical. For Pinker, the 
physical, geometrical and purposive concepts that are employed in the representation of the meaning of 
locative verbs constitute the scaffolding of human thought and are part of our innate endowment. So, 
although concepts such as POUR, PAINT, SMEAR and the like are not innate there is a battery of 
more basic physical, geometrical and purposive concepts that are innate and serve to play a role in the 
complex structures that represent such concepts or the meanings of the words that express them.  
In sum then,  Pinker’s examination of locative alternation  serves  to motivate  a substantial  view  
about concepts and the representation  of  meaning that  clashes with Fodor’s key central claim that 
most  lexical concepts are unanalysable  atoms. In addition to locative alternation, Pinker also considers 
six other linguistic phenomena.4 All of these, he argues,   serve to motivate similar conclusions about 
yet more verbs. As with locative verbs, such verbs have complex meanings and belong to microclasses 
of verbs that overlap in the representation of their meaning. In addition to the physical and geometrical 
concepts involved in the case of locative verbs, further concepts of having, knowing, helping, acting 
and intending are involved in the representation of the meaning of such verbs. Thus, the core concepts 
that constitute the scaffolding of thought and which we use to construct complex concepts and 
represent complex meanings include psychological concepts.  
 
§ 3. Pinker’s theoretical objections to Fodor’s extreme nativism 
 
We can now see why, despite his general nativist sympathies, Pinker would want to take issue with 
Fodor’s extreme concept nativism. For, in arguing that most lexical concepts  are un-analysable  atoms, 
Fodor   is in direct conflict  with Pinker’s  core idea that the meaning of  many words  are represented 
by means of  a network of core concepts  that play a key role in the representation of  the meaning of 
many distinct words.  In short, Fodor and Pinker are in dispute over the issue of the analysability of 
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lexical of lexical concepts or the meanings of the words that express those concepts. Not surprisingly 
then, Pinker’s central objection to Fodor relates to the issue of analysis where he attempts to bring to 
bear the considerations described in the previous section. I will examine this central objection in the 
next section. Pinker also offers three objections that he variously calls “conceptual problems” (97) and 
“theoretical problems” (98) for extreme nativism. These are interesting objections but, so I will argue 
in this section, they are far from devastating. 
The first theoretical or conceptual problem is that extreme nativism does not sit happily with 
evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biology tells us  that when  we evolve innate items  that are  
expensive,  elaborate and useful we do  so  because those items bestowed a reproductive  advantage  on  
our ancestors. But, objects Pinker,  it  is hard to see what  reproductive advantage many of the concepts 
that Fodor  postulates as  innate  could have  given our ancestors as  such concepts are of things that 
have only recently been invented (for example, TROMBONE and CABURETOR). This is essentially 
an objection that Putnam (1988) has directed at Fodor. My response is as follows. When  evolution  
bestows a battery of traits on  an  organism in virtue  of  their  providing a  reproductive advantage it 
will tend  to bestow a  further collection  of traits that, while providing no reproductive advantage 
themselves, ride piggyback  on the    beneficial  traits. Thus, there is no need for all our innate concepts 
to have provided our ancestors with a reproductive advantage so long as some of them did.5  
The second theoretical or conceptual problem relates to learning the meaning of words. Even 
Fodor accepts that we learn the meaning of the words of the language that we speak. For example, a 
child learning English will not know innately that the word ‘rabbit’ means rabbit or expresses  the  
concept RABBIT. Now, argues Pinker, children typically learn the meaning of a word on the basis of 
only a small number of examples of its use. But extreme nativism makes it difficult to see how the 
child could so learn on the basis of such limited evidence as that evidence will be equally consistent 
with the target word’s expressing any of many distinct concepts that are part of the child’s innate 
endowment. The example that Pinker provides to illustrate the problem comes from Quine (1960). A 
child hears an adult say “Gavagai” in the presence of a rabbit. This evidence is equally consistent with 
that word’s expressing any of the following concepts: RABBIT, UNDETTACHED RABBIT PART, 
HOPPING RABBIT, TIME SLICE OF A RABBIT and so on. If all of these concepts belong to the 
child’s innate endowment then how is she to work out which particular one is “gavagai” expresses? 
This is effectively a version of the poverty of the stimulus argument and so it is rather ironic that Pinker 
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invokes it in an attack on nativism given that poverty of the stimulus considerations have been central 
to the nativist’s armoury since at least Chomsky’s Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Chomsky 1965).6 
The main problem with Pinker’s argument here is that it is difficult to see how the opponent of 
nativism fares any better. A child with a limited innate endowment who  is trying to learn what 
‘gavagai’ means will still have the resources to attribute a diverse range of meanings  if,  as Pinker has 
to accept, concepts  such as RABBIT,  UNDETTACHED RABBIT PART, HOPPING RABBIT, TIME 
SLICE OF A RABBIT and so on, are built out of a range  of basic innate  concepts. So how does the 
child decide which complex to build when attempting to learn the meaning of ‘gavagai’? A second 
problem is that it is far from clear that the extreme nativist cannot appeal to other aspects of the child’s 
innate endowment to explain how the child deals with the problem of a limited evidence base when 
attempting to learn the meaning of a word. Nativists who are happy to attribute to us a large stock of 
innate concepts are prone to be equally happy to attribute to us innate assumptions, knowledge or 
constraints. Such an innate assumption, knowledge item or constraint could help direct the child toward 
a particular conclusion in a manner reminiscent of Universal Grammar in the case of syntax 
acquisition.7  For example, consider a child that has the innate assumption that words typically refer to 
whole things that persist through space and time. Operating with this assumption the child would be 
pushed away from concluding that ‘gavagai’ expressed either UNDETTACHED RABBIT PART or 
TIME SLICE OF A RABBIT.  
Pinker’s final theoretical or conceptual problem relates to explaining the use of concepts. We use 
concepts to categorise phenomena and to reason. If many lexical concepts are analysable then 
understanding how we use basic concepts can help us to understand how we use the complex concepts 
of which they are components.  For example, if CAUSE is a component of a whole raft of concepts 
including KILL, MELT, BOUNCE, BUTTER, and so on, then understanding how we use the former 
concept will shed light on how we understand the latter concepts. However, an implication of extreme 
nativism is that is that we do not make any such explanatory progress when we shed light on how we 
use putative basic concepts like CAUSE. For, as KILL, MELT, and the like, do not contain the concept 
CAUSE, we are forced to start afresh. 
There are several points that might be made in response to Pinker’s reasoning here. First, it is  far 
from clear what Pinker  has to offer by way of an explanation of  our  use of basic  concepts such of 
CAUSE and the precise role on any such explanation in a further explanation how we  use non-basic 
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concepts. Second, Fodor’s nativism does leave a lot to be explained but this in it   is not devastating 
problem. Fodor could argue that his nativism is part of an ongoing research project that has yet to carry 
through to its completion. Scientific theories typically raise as many questions are they answer but that 
is not normally taken to tell against such theories as the theory of evolution by natural selection or 
quantum mechanics so why should it be taken to tell against extreme nativism? A failure to explain is 
only a problem if the theory implies that the phenomenon in question is inherently mysterious or 
without explanation. Third, it is far from clear that the extreme nativist could not use general resources 
in an explanation of our use of many concepts. In effect, Pinker is assuming our use of distinct 
concepts could have a common explanation only if they had common components. But there  is  the 
possibility that our  use  of  distinct  concepts that didn’t share components relied upon  common 
computational  mechanisms  so  that a common  explanation of their use could  appeal to such 
mechanisms. 
 
§ 4.  Pinker’s central objection 
 
Pinker’s central objection to Fodor’s argument for extreme concept nativism involves drawing upon his 
explanation of alternation in order to undermine Fodor’s key premise that lexical concepts or the 
meanings that they express typically cannot be analysed in terms of more basic concepts. As Pinker 
puts it: “My main brief against Extreme Nativism is that its key premise – that word meanings cannot 
be decomposed into more basic concepts – is mistaken” (95). According to Pinker Fodor provides little 
argument for this premise relying (in Fodor, 1981) on a limited exploration of the transitive verb 
“paint”. By examining Fodor’s treatment of that verb in the light of his own exploration of alternation, 
Pinker seeks to show that there is little motivation for Fodor’s central premise. Fodor examines a series 
of increasingly complex attempts to define the transitive verb “paint” beginning with “cover a surface 
with paint”.  Each of these definitions is subject to counterexamples and in order to deal with these 
counterexamples the definition needs to be made increasingly complex by invoking a rapidly 
expanding circle of concepts including the concepts of ANIMATE AGENT, INTENDED EFFECT and 
MEANS TO AN END. In the light of this Fodor quickly comes to the conclusion that the attempted   
definitions of such a prima facie simple verb are becoming so baroque as to suggest that the task of 
constructing a satisfactory definition is utterly hopeless.  Pinker accepts the legitimacy of each of 
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Fodor’s counterexamples but does not regard them as motivating legitimate despair. This is because the 
counterexamples Fodor presents illustrate the need to appeal to the very concepts that Pinker has 
highlighted as core concepts that belong to our innate endowment and forming the basis of the 
representation of the microclasses into which we assign verbs. In other words, Fodor’s examination of 
“paint” does not suggest that there is anything idiosyncratic about the analysis of that verb. Rather, it 
does the opposite by suggesting that that analysis will appeal to concepts that recur throughout the 
analysis of many of the other verbs belonging to English. Had Fodor examined a wider palette of verbs, 
as did Pinker in his investigation of alternation, he would have seen this and so might have come to a 
view of the situation that echoes Pinker’s conceptual semantics. 
What are we to make of this central objection to Fodor? Does it fare any better than his 
theoretical/conceptual objections? I think that there are a number of problems. The first problem is that 
Pinker underestimates what he has to do in order to defeat Fodor. He needs to show not merely that 
verbs like “paint” have a partial analysis in terms of the core concepts that he has identified. Rather, he 
needs to show that they have a full analysis. But the latter is something that he doesn’t do for, as we 
have seen, the point of his treatment of alternation is to group together multiples of distinct verbs into 
microclasses the members of which   overlap in their meaning. In other words, Pinker’s analysis serves 
to bring out what verbs belonging to any given microclass have in common and what distinguishes 
them from the members of all other microclasses. In  doing this, it serves to obscure what distinguishes 
the  meanings of  members of any particular microclass from one another, for example,  what 
distinguishes “pour” from “dribble”, “daub” from “smear”, “deluge” from “flood” and so  on. Pinker is 
fully aware of this. For example he writes: 
 
The verb to butter has to contain a representation of a butterlike substance, and if someone were to 
say that Bush has out-Nixoned Nixon, he must have in mind some noteworthy trait of the thirty-
seventh president. But these and  countless other sensory,  cognitive and emotional distinctions  
are  invisible  to that part of the mind that sees some  verbs as alike and  others as different when 
deciding how to use them  in a grammatical construction.(82) 
 
The upshot of this is that Pinker’s explanation of alternation could be correct without implying that any 
of the lexical verbs he considers has a meaning that is fully analysable in terms of more basic concepts. 
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But if such verbs have an element of their meaning that cannot be analysed, precisely that that serves to 
distinguish them from all other verbs – particularly from those in their home microclass – then Fodor’s 
central premise would turn out to be correct. So what Pinker needs to do  is motivate the claim  that 
these putatively idiosyncratic elements of meaning have a full analysis in terms  of more basic concepts 
that can play a role in the analysis of many distinct meanings. But this is something that he singularly 
fails to do. Now of course that does not in itself imply that such an analysis is impossible but I for one 
sympathise with the Fodorian thought that the poor track record of philosophical and linguistic 
attempts to fully analyse concepts and meanings does not license optimism. 
A second problem relates to Pinker’s attempt to generalise from the verbs he examines to all 
lexical concepts. Despite the examination of “paint” in “The Present Status of the Innateness Debate” 
much of Fodor’s consideration of conceptual atomism8 centres on nominal concepts such as HORSE, 
WATER, DOORKNOB, and CARBURETOR. With respect to such concepts Pinker writes: “if hit and 
cut and break aren’t innate then it’s all the less likely that trombone and carburetor are” (107). This 
strikes me  as way too quick as Pinker provides no  reasons at all  for  thinking that such nouns fall into 
microclasses bound  together in terms of an inventory of more basic  innate concepts. For example, he 
presents no analogue of the locative alternation phenomena discussed above in connection with such 
nouns. 
A third problem relates to drawing an anti-nativist conclusion from the failure of Fodor’s key 
premise. Suppose that many of our lexical concepts are fully analysable in terms of a stock of more 
basic concepts. It would not follow from this fact alone that the non-basic concepts were learned and 
not innate. For it is perfectly coherent to postulate that our innate endowment includes complex 
structures of organised concepts.  As Fodor puts it: “it is open for the Nativist to hold either that (a) all 
or most lexical concepts have no internal structure, or (b), if they are internally structured, nevertheless 
the fact that they are plays no role in the explanation of their acquisition” (Fodor 1981: 279). Thus, 
Pinker should conclude that Fodor’s argument for nativism breaks down and not that extreme nativism 
is false.  It might be objected that the anti-nativist position is to be preferred, all else equal, on grounds 
of plausibility so that the extreme nativist needs a compelling argument in favour of their position. But 
this leads to a fourth problem.  
The fourth problem with Pinker’s argument is that the complexity of his analysis of the verbs he 
examines runs the risk of generating of poverty of the stimulus argument for the conclusion that the 
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concepts that they express are innate.  In general, a poverty of the stimulus argument is an argument of 
the following form. A particular   item (for example a concept, belief or piece of knowledge) is 
widespread across a population even though the experiences that the members of the population have 
prior to the item’s manifesting itself are not rich enough to facilitate its learning on their basis. 
Therefore, the item cannot be learned and the best explanation for its being widespread is that it is 
innate. As is often pointed out, children acquire vocabulary items at a rapid rate often picking up a new 
word and grasping its meaning on the basis on only a handful of encounters of its being used and with 
little in the way of explicit instruction as to the meaning of the target word. This point holds of the 
verbs that Pinker considers. What Pinker implies is that the analysis of any given such verb will be 
complex, intricate and subtle. Even if a child possesses all that she needs in terms of more basic 
concepts for analysing the verb in question, how could she possibly gain the evidence she needs to 
learn the correct analysis? How, for example, can  witnessing a handful of instances  where an act of 
painting is referred to using  the transitive verb ‘paint’ inform her  that meaning of that word is built 
out  of such concepts as ANIMATE  AGENT, INTENDED EFFECT, MEANS TO  AN END and so 
on, and thus means much more  than something’s merely becoming covered in paint? The problem  is 
that the evidence  that the  child gets as to  the meaning of ‘paint’ is  consistent with quite different 
hypotheses as  to that meaning making it a mystery as to why children usually come  to the  same 
conclusions as to  the  meaning of that word.    
To drive home  this point about the impoverished nature of the experiences on which children  
typically acquire a grasp of the meaning of  the words  of  their first language, consider  two verbs 
which Pinker assigns  to  the same microclass, namely “pour”  and “dribble”.  
What is the difference between pouring and dribbling? Some key differences relate to the nature of 
the stuff involved, the strength of the flow of that stuff and whether or not the flow is unbroken. One 
can pour a liquid but one can also pour something that isn’t liquid such as flour or lentils. However, to 
dribble something it has to be a liquid; “he dribbled flour into the bowl” sounds wrong to my ears 
whereas “he poured flour into the bowl” is perfectly grammatical. In the case of pouring the flow of the 
stuff poured can range from heavy to light. But not so in the case of dribbling; a heavy dribble is more 
of a case of sloshing than dribbling. And in cases of pouring the stream of stuff has to be unbroken 
whereas in dribbling the liquid involved has to break up into droplets. 
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Now consider a child who is attempting to learn the verb “pour”. She witnesses an event of 
pouring and hears it described thus: “he poured milk into his tea”. The child represents a range of 
properties of this event utilising basic concepts she already possesses. Her problem is to work out 
which of these properties are essential to its being an event of pouring and which are not. Unless she 
solves this problem she will not know which properties should figure in the representation of the 
meaning of “pour”. More specifically, she has to answer questions  such as the following: need the 
stuff  involved be a liquid?; is the rate  of flow significant?; is the volume of stuff involved or the 
duration of  the  event significant?; can one pour absent-mindedly or must deliberation or  
concentration  be involved?; must the container become full?; and so on. Short of guessing, a child 
cannot determine the answer to these questions on the basis of only a small number of exposures to the 
use of the verb “pour”. For, a small number of exposures will equally license radically different 
answers and, therefore, different conclusions as to the meaning of “pour”. There is no general principle 
that the child can rely upon for with respect to related verbs the questions that I have highlighted have 
quite different answers. For example, pouring, unlike dribbling, needn’t involve a liquid; pouring, 
unlike dribbling and drizzling, involves an unbroken flow; pouring, unlike dribbling and drizzling, can 
involve a heavy or light flow; pouring, unlike drizzling, can be done absent-mindedly; and so on. What 
this suggests is that a child will need to be exposed to numerous uses of the verb “pour” in order to 
effectively work out its meaning. If, as Pinker concedes, her exposure is limited then we should expect 
different children to come to different conclusions as to the meaning of “pour”. But as such variation is 
not the norm the implication would appear to be that what enables a child to learn the meaning of 
“pour” is that she has a prior grasp of the concept POUR and that she represents the events she hears 
described by means of “pour” using this concept. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum then, Pinker’s critique of Fodor’s extreme concept nativism breaks down and for all its prima 
facie implausibility that doctrine still stands. Reaching this conclusion does not involve rejecting 
Pinker’s treatment of alternation or his claim that the meaning of many verbs are represented in the 
mind-brain by means of complex representational structures.  For, all that is consistent with those verbs 
not having a meaning that is fully analysable and that is all Fodor needs for his argument to go through. 
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Even was Pinker to establish that the verbs he considers have meanings that are fully analysable in 
terms of a battery of more basic concepts, his anti-nativist conclusion would not follow. For, nativism 
does not require atomism and in arguing against atomism Pinker inadvertently awakens poverty of the 
stimulus considerations that tell against his own position. 
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1 A lexical concept is a concept expressed by a single-morpheme word. 
2 In ‘The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy’ Fodor illustrates this point through a discussion 
of the transitive verbal concept PAINT. 
3 See Cain (2002) for discussion. 
4 Namely dative alternation, causative alternation, conative alternation, possessor-raising, middle voice 
alternation and anticausative alternation. 
5 See Cain (2004) for an elaboration and defence of this line of thought.  
6 Chomsky explicitly appeals to poverty of the stimulus considerations in arguing for concept nativism 
in Chomksy (2000). 
7 The case for UG’s playing such a role as has been ably argued for by Pinker (1994) following 
Chomsky (1986). 
8 For example, in Fodor 1987, 1990 and 1998. 
